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Empathy and helping motives are more closely connected than philosophers and 
psychologists have realized. Empathy doesn’t just cause sympathetic concern for others, but 
is conceptually tied to it. When we empathize with someone’s distress at their pain, we 
ourselves are distressed by that pain and that in itself necessarily constitutes a motive to rid 
them of that pain. But helping motives like compassion or concern for others can be shown to 
be conceptually impossible in the absence of empathy. Compassion as a feeling and 
compassion as a motive are thus inseparable from one another, and this then lets the Chinese 
complementarity of yin and yang enter the picture. Yin can be viewed as a kind of 
receptivity, and compassion as a feeling instantiates such receptivity; but compassion as a 
motive instantiates yang conceived along somewhat traditional lines as a form of strong 
purposiveness. If moral sentimentalism is on the right track, then the motives and feelings it 
views as foundational to normative morality turn out to instantiate yin and yang conceived in 
traditional terms as an indissoluble complementarity. Moral sentimentalism properly pursued 








I have written a great deal in defense of a sentimentalist form of virtue ethics in 
recent years, and like David Hume, my work has placed a great emphasis on 
empathy (Hume didn’t have the word “empathy” but often spoke of what we 
mean by empathy using the term “sympathy”). I have argued that empathy not 
only motivates us to help others (and even to conform to deontological side-
constraints and the moral demands of respect and justice), but actually gives us 
a criterion for distinguishing right from wrong across the complete spectrum of 
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possible cases.1 But this is not the place to repeat those arguments. I have also 
defended the role of empathy in the making of moral judgments (though 
somewhat differently from the way Hume advocated such a role), but, again, 
this is not the place for me to try to recapitulate all that I have said in that 
direction.  
So what am I going to do here? Well, as I said just above, my view 
subscribes to and depends on the motivating force of empathy, but until very 
recently I think I had a somewhat distorted view of how empathy motivates 
altruistic behavior or just plain sympathy with the plight of others; a distorted 
view, however, that I shared with some of the most significant psychologists 
who have written about empathy. Martin Hoffman, Nancy Eisenberg, C. D. 
Batson, and I myself (following their lead) have long believed that the relation 
between empathy and sympathy/altruism is an empirical issue, that human 
sympathy and altruism develop as a result of developing empathy and that this 
is an entirely contingent matter that we have to learn about from the science of 
psychology (or personal observation).2 But I now think we have all been 
mistaken about this. I therefore propose, initially, to tell you why I think we 
have been confused on this subject, and this conclusion will prepare us for the 
main topic of the present essay, the question whether there can be such a thing 
as altruism/sympathy independently of empathy. If there can’t be such a thing, 
if such a thing turns out to be unintelligible, then the case for a sentimentalist 
account of morality will have been considerably strengthened. 
2 
Let’s first talk about terminology. Most of us don’t find it very difficult 
nowadays to distinguish between empathy and sympathy. When Bill Clinton 
said “I feel your pain,” he was talking about what we now call empathy, and 
sympathy, by contrast, simply means a desire to see someone’s lot in life or 
present condition improved. And (though this is a point that hasn’t, I believe, 
been made in the philosophical or psychological literature) sympathy can be said 
to be a kind of minimum level of benevolence and of altruism/altruistic 
motivation more generally. A benevolent and altruistic person wants to help 
                                           
1 See my Moral Sentimentalism, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
2 See M. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000; N. Eisenberg, The Caring Child, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992; C. D. 




another person, and sympathy may just be expressed in the desire to see the 
other person helped (by someone, not necessarily oneself). But I don’t think one 
can actually count as sympathetic in this latter sense or way unless there is 
something one would oneself do to help the other person. If one wouldn’t help the 
other person even if it was incredibly easy to do so, then any expression of 
sympathy would have to be considered hypocritical, “crocodile” sympathy. (I 
am reminded of Doctor Johnson’s complaint about people who just “pay you 
with feeling.”) But having made these points we still have a seeming conceptual 
divide: between empathy, on the one hand, and sympathy/compassion/ 
/benevolence/altruism, on the other. And I think that in the most important 
sense or way, this divide is actually illusory. Empathy’s connection with 
sympathy, benevolence, compassion, caring, etc., is conceptual, not empirical. 
However, to make this point I first have to distinguish, as many 
philosophers and psychologists nowadays do, between two kinds of empathy. 
There is projective empathy, which involves putting oneself into the shoes or the 
head of another person (or animal), and then there is what is variously called 
associative, receptive, or emotional empathy, which occurs when we are 
invaded, so to speak, by the feelings or attitudes of another person. This is the 
kind of empathy Hume mainly spoke of using the term “sympathy,” and it is 
the kind that plays the most central role in my own approach to virtue ethics 
and that, as I now think, is conceptually tied to sympathy, etc. Empathy in 
some of its embodiments depends on a certain degree or amount of conceptual 
and cognitive sophistication. A child of four cannot empathize with the 
sufferings of the people in another country the way an adolescent or adult can, 
because they simply lack the requisite concepts. And when a father is infected 
by his daughter’s enthusiasm for stamp collecting, this too requires the father to 
know something about stamps, about collecting, and about his daughter. But 
the empathic infection occurs without the father consciously willing for that to 
happen, so we are talking here, not of the projective kind of empathy, but of the 
associative emotional kind. 
And notice one thing. The father who is infected or, to switch metaphors, 
who takes in his daughter’s enthusiasm by a kind of empathic osmosis, doesn’t 
merely become enthusiastic in an unspecific or vague way. The enthusiasm has 
the same intentional object as his daughter’s, namely, stamp collecting. (There is 
some ambiguity or leeway here as to whether he starts wanting to help her 
collect stamps or starts wanting to collect for himself or both.) In other words, 
receptive or associative empathy takes in an attitude, motive, or feeling with its 
intentional object, and this is something that Hume seems to have recognized 
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when he pointed out in the Treatise of Human Nature that we humans have a 
strong tendency to take in the attitudes of those around us. Thus if my parents 
love Winston Churchill (mine did), one can and will, without knowing it, take in 
that attitude, but the attitude taken in isn’t just some generalized or vague form 
of positive feeling: it is positive feeling directed toward Churchill as its intention 
object.  
 These observations give us all we need to show that there is a conceptual, 
not a mere empirical, connection between the emotional or associative kind of 
empathy, on the one hand, and sympathetic, benevolent, altruistic, and/or 
compassionate motivation, on the other. If someone feels pain and is distressed 
about it, then they automatically, ex vi termini, count as motivated to alleviate 
that pain. That’s just what distress means. But then consider someone who 
empathizes with, who empathically takes in, the other person’s distress at their 
pain. This means feeling distressed oneself about their pain, and, again ex vi 
termini, this constitutes motivation to alleviate that person’s pain. Which is 
what we mean by altruistic or benevolent motivation. So on strictly conceptual 
grounds empathy involves sympathy with and motivation to help another 
person. (Of course, the motivation may not issue in action if stronger contrary 
motives are also in play in the given situation.) 
However, those who accept the above argument often have an interesting 
way of (in effect) resisting its force and implications. They say (at talks I have 
given) that even if empathy entails sympathy on the grounds I mention, there 
still might be such a thing as sympathy without empathy. And till very recently 
I haven’t known how to answer them. I have tended to grant that there might 
in principle be such a thing as sympathy and benevolence without empathy in 
(extraterrestrial) species other than our own and have usually just insisted that 
in the human case, there is no such thing as sympathy or benevolence without a 
developed capacity for empathy. But now I think the case can be made stronger, 
that sympathy is conceptually impossible in the absence of empathy, and the 
very title of the present essay gestures allusively in the direction of the kind of 
argument I am now prepared to offer for that conclusion.  
 
3 
In her famous book Intention, published in 1957, Elizabeth Anscombe made a 
conceptual point that very much bears remembering.3 She argued (roughly) that 
                                           
3 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957, p. 70 and passim. 
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certain desires don’t in fact make any sense, that if someone claimed to desire a 
saucer of mud, we couldn’t attach any sense to what they were saying unless 
they went on to suggest some intelligible reason why they wanted this: e. g., 
someone had told them they would give them a lot of money if they gave them a 
saucer of mud, or they needed the mud for a beautifying facial, or some such. 
The point is well taken; it makes no sense to suppose that someone just wants a 
saucer of mud and has no further reason for this desire beyond the simple desire 
itself. But how exactly does this bear on the topic of the present essay? 
Well, I think it bears immediately and, I hope, decisively. Those who 
questioned whether sympathy needs to be underlain by empathy were saying 
that one might just be sympathetic or benevolent without there being any 
further basis for that motivation, that such motivation might, for example, be 
simply instinctual. But I now think this is a mistake, a conceptual mistake, and 
my reason for thinking so partly comes from Anscombe’s earlier example. 
Though the matter is far from as obvious as what we (with benefit of hindsight) 
can say about the desire for a saucer of mud, I think, I now think, we in fact 
can’t make sense of there being benevolence or sympathy lacking any further 
basis or reason for the benevolence or sympathy. 
However, in order to show you this, I think I need to begin by making use of 
a maneuver that Bishop Butler used to very good effect in his Sermons from the 
Rolls Chapel. Butler wanted to show that people are capable of altruism, but he 
recognized a certain difficulty standing between himself and that goal: the fact 
that people know that helping others can be a very rewarding and even 
pleasurable experience and are inclined to conclude that we sympathetically 
help others for egoistic, rather than altruistic, reasons. (There is some evidence 
that even Kant was taken in by this kind of thinking.) So Butler, rather 
ingeniously, changed the subject from benevolence and altruism to malice and 
revenge. He pointed out that the person who feels malice toward another may 
get pleasure from hurting them, but also typically risks his or her own happiness 
and comfort in their effort to do dirt to the person they hate. Hurting the person 
is their goal, and the only pleasure they get in this connection is from the fact, 
when it is a fact, that that goal is (thought to be) achieved. And this is 
something it is fairly easy for us to recognize. But once we see the case for 
regarding malice and revenge as non-egoistic motives, it is easy or easier to see 
that an analogous case can be made for regarding benevolent action and 
motivation as non-egoistic. And I propose to use a similar maneuver to deal with 
the issue of whether sympathy and benevolence can ever be sheer and basic. To 
help us with that issue, it will be useful to focus on the opposite of these feelings, 
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on malice and the desire for revenge, the very feelings or motives that proved so 
useful to Butler’s purposes. 
Now no one could think that (the desire for) revenge could exist all on its 
own: revenge is always based on some offense or injury, imagined or otherwise. 
But this then contrasts, or seems to contrast, with malice (or malevolence). The 
Shakespearean critic A. C. Bradley once described Iago as having felt 
“motiveless malignity” toward Othello, and though this may not be entirely 
accurate to the play (Othello had passed over Iago for promotion at the time the 
play Othello begins), the idea of motiveless malignity doesn’t seem a 
contradiction in terms the way the idea of motiveless revenge does. However, I 
still think we should be suspicious about the notion of motiveless malignity. 
When we think of the malice that actually exists among or in humans, there 
always seems to be an element of revenge or some other deeper motivation for 
the malice. Iago bore malice toward Othello, but also had a motive of revenge 
against Othello, and just think about it. When you and I feel hatred toward 
someone, don’t we always think we have a basis or justification for feeling the 
way we do? Even the paranoid schizophrenic who deliberately injures others 
imagines that the others are out to get him or have done him dirt in the past, 
and so their malice and hatred toward others doesn’t, in psychological terms, 
stand on its own.  
But perhaps the psychopath raises a problem here. Some (but I don’t think 
all) psychopaths have hereditary or congenital brain lesions or abnormalities. 
And many such psychopaths seem to want to hurt or harm others even if this in 
no way advances or promotes their own well-being. May such psychopaths not 
demonstrate the sheer malice that I am saying is conceptually impossible? Well, 
I am not sure. But I don’t think we should rush too quickly toward classifying 
such people as having motiveless malignity. Perhaps, for example, their 
brain/neurological deficiencies make them paranoid like some schizophrenics, 
which would undercut the claim that there is nothing motivating or behind their 
malice toward so many others. Alternatively, their brain abnormalities or earlier 
psychological/sexual abuse may make it harder for them to control or moderate 
their anger when unpleasant things occur or are done to them, and this may 
make them angry at the world in a way most of us aren’t. But once again, such 
anger and the malice that embodies it are not unmotivated or lacking in 
intelligible psychological grounding. So at the very least I am inclined to say the 
following. 
Aside from bizarre cases like psychopathy that we don’t yet perhaps know 
enough about to characterize properly in moral-psychological terms, the idea of 
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motiveless malice doesn’t make a lot of sense. To say of someone “he just hates 
people, and there is absolutely no reason why he does” seems to me to be saying 
something quite difficult to make sense of. And in that respect I think the case is 
similar to Anscombe’s example. The simple desire for a saucer of mud is not 
something we can readily understand, and I say the same about the simple 
desire to hurt people, sheer malice. And if one can always wonder whether the 
neurologically damaged psychopath might not have a basic and unaccountable-
for hatred of others, one can wonder too whether such a psychopath or someone 
else with a brain abnormality might not just have an unaccountable-for desire 
for mud. If we can’t rule the former out, how can we rule out the latter? But, 
turning the tables, might we not rather conclude that it is as difficult to make 
sense of the idea that brain malfunctioning might make us hate people for no 
psychologically operative reason as it is to make sense of the idea that such 
malfunctioning might make someone desire saucers of mud for no other reason 
than that desire itself. Every case of malice we are actually aware of seems to 
have some psychological basis other than the malice itself, and I can see no 
reason to think that any possible or conceivable malice could really be 
otherwise.  
But then this argument transposes to benevolence, sympathy, and altruism. 
If the idea of sheer raw malice makes no genuine sense, why should the idea of 
sheer raw benevolence make any more sense? Of course, we are aware of our 
sympathy for others more vividly and/or self-consciously than we are of the 
(potential) empathy or empathic transmission of feeling that I say underlies 
sympathy. But this is an epistemic matter, not a causal or ontological one. Even 
if we typically know sympathy before we know empathy, it doesn’t follow that 
the former can exist without the latter. We may also know our own desire for 
revenge more vividly and immediately than we know the cause of that desire, 
but the former still depends for its existence on the latter. And similarly for lots 
and lots of other cases where the ordo essendi and the ordo cognoscendi proceed in 
opposite directions. We run into difficulties when we prescind from issues of 
knowability and just try to imagine malice with no psychological cause, and the 
case of benevolence/sympathy seems analogous. Imagine someone who is in 
trouble and someone who has sympathy for their plight. Doesn’t there have to 
be something that gets them to be or makes them sympathetic with the other 
person’s trouble? After all, a psychopath can recognize that someone is in 
trouble and feel no sympathy whatever for them, so the sheer recognition of 
another’s trouble doesn’t automatically arouse the sympathy of a bystander or 
onlooker. And in parallel doesn’t there have to be something in, something 
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about, the onlooker that leads them to feel sympathetic? The idea that someone 
might just automatically want another person’s suffering isn’t a very clear one, 
and the idea that someone might just automatically want another person to 
escape a difficult situation isn’t a very clear one either. 
Now in the case of the psychopath, there is something missing, something 
which, if present, would allow and account for their sympathetic motivation 
toward someone who is suffering or in trouble. And the missing element or 
ingredient is, of course, empathy. As we have seen, empathy is a mechanism 
that converts distress on one person’s part to similarly-directed distress on the 
part of another person, and this yields or constitutes altruistic motivation and 
sympathy on the part of the person to whom the distress is conveyed. (This can 
happen with some non-human animals as well.) In such a case, we can 
understand, and understand very well, how altruism and sympathy can arise. 
But if we don’t posit empathy, then the motivation behind or for altruism seems 
difficult or impossible to fathom. And that is just what I am saying.  
Now the reader may want to reply at this point that I am forgetting how 
easy it sometimes is to feel sympathetic concern in the absence of empathy. If 
(to take a famous example from Confucian thought) a child is about to fall into a 
well, can’t one feel concern and act on that concern even if the child doesn’t see 
their own danger and there is therefore no distressed state of the child to 
empathically latch onto? Yes, all of this is possible, but it only constitutes an 
objection to what I am saying about sympathy and altruism, if empathy 
exclusively takes in actual psychological states, and that assumption is far too 
limiting. It is possible to empathize with the distress, and suffering one knows 
someone will have if one does or doesn’t do something, and in the case of the 
child about to fall into a well, the observer can have a quite vivid sense of what 
the child will feel and suffer once they have fallen into the well. Sympathetic, 
caring, altruistic adults are capable of feeling empathy with what can or will 
happen to or in another person (the psychology literature on empathy discusses 
this possibility), and so in the kind of normal case of helping motivation the 
reader may have worried about, both empathy and sympathy are present.  
 In the end, therefore, I think sympathy and altruism without empathy are 
very much like a basic desire for a saucer of mud: something we really can’t 
understand. And at this point this comparison shouldn’t perhaps be so 
surprising. If desire has intelligibility conditions and cannot attach to some 
intentional object independently of those conditions, then sympathy and 
altruism, which involve specific (and positive) forms of intentionally directed 
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desire, may have their own intelligibility conditions; and can one think of a 




In the light of the above, we might want now to consider the more general 
question whether empathy is necessary to any and every sort of moral 
helpfulness toward others. Sympathy and benevolence as I have been describing 
them don’t rest on any specifically moral or ethical thinking (this is another 
aspect of their naturalness in Hume’s sense of the term). When I benevolently 
help another person, I needn’t be thinking that this is my moral duty or that it 
would be a virtuous thing for me to do—I may simply be impelled by my sense 
of what the other is suffering and my empathy for their state of mind. But in 
describing things in these terms, I have remained pretty much entirely within 
the sentimentalist moral tradition that derives from Hutcheson and Hume. 
Rationalists have other ways of justifying and explaining the motivation behind 
actions that seek to promote the well-being of others, and it would be interesting 
to consider whether any of them allows coherently for beneficent actions based 
on something other than benevolence, compassion, empathy, or (psychological) 
altruism. 
Kant seems, for example, to have thought that our rationality (or rational 
freedom) as such can lead us to help others. According to Kant, reason grounds 
the Categorical Imperative, and one of the duties that follow out of the 
Categorical Imperative is the (imperfect) duty to promote the welfare of others. 
But, in addition, Kant thinks pure reason not only grounds this obligation but 
makes it have a certain motivational force with us. However, rather than try to 
tease out Kant’s reasons for saying all this, I would rather talk about some 
recent ethical rationalists who I believe make the case for Kant’s conclusions 
easier to understand than Kant himself does. Let’s see if some more recent 
rationalist approach allows for helping motivation independently of an appeal to 
empathy. 
I think John McDowell has made the overall best case, in rationalist or 
cognitivist terms, for the idea that empathy isn’t necessary to helping 
motivation. In his “Virtue and Reason” he argues (roughly) that if someone 
isn’t motivated to help someone in dire need or distress, that can only be because 
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they don’t fully appreciate what the other person is going through.4 A 
thoroughgoing apprehension of relevant facts can be automatically motivating, 
and in such cases, McDowell argues, the cognitive and the motivational are 
inextricably bound together—they can’t even be conceptually prized apart. 
Now McDowell’s view and others like it have been criticized as “queer” for tying 
the cognitive and the motivational so tightly together. But I am not going to 
object to this aspect of what McDowell is committed to. I can think of many 
cases where it seems plausible to suppose that cognition and motivation are 
inseparable and have discussed the matter at great length in my book A 
Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind.5 My objection to McDowell’s 
cognitivism/rationalism will come at his views from a somewhat different 
direction. We need to go back to the case of psychopaths. 
What prevents a psychopath from fully appreciating how bad or painful it is 
or would be for one of his (potential) victims and being motivated to help them 
(or not hurt them in the first place)? Psychopaths are famous for being able to 
“get into the heads” of their potential victims (this presumably is projective 
empathy), so how can the rationalist like (the early) McDowell say that their 
lack of appropriate motivation is due to their lack of appreciation of relevant 
facts, to their not seeing certain facts as salient in the way a moral person 
would? Well, let me suggest that empathy may make the difference here and 
may be (part of) the only possible explanation of the difference of motivation 
between a psychopath and a moral person. Psychopaths may be able to get into 
the heads of other people, but they characteristically lack the ability or 
tendency to empathically feel what others feel. So if the psychopath fails to 
appreciate certain facts about another’s need or suffering, fails to see those facts 
as salient in a way that would motivate them to help, that may be precisely 
                                           
4 McDowell, “Virtue and Reason” in R. Crisp and M. Slote eds., Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. Incidentally, if someone argues against the analogy between 
malevolence/malice and benevolence that I have been making use of on the grounds that 
benevolence seeks to bring about something impartially good, the flourishing of other human 
beings, and malice seeks to bring about something bad, their suffering or faring poorly, they 
have actually given the game away. If benevolence is based in the thought of the goodness of 
what it seeks to bring about, then it isn’t the sheer desire for the welfare of another, but 
rather anchors itself in a conception of what is good in itself. So this sort of objection does 
nothing to show that sheer benevolence, the sheer desire for the welfare or happiness/non-
suffering of another, makes sense.  





because they lack (associative or emotional) empathy. It would then turn out 
that the lack of empathy makes it impossible for the psychopath to fully 
apprehend the suffering of others and to be motivated on that basis to help 
rather than hurt them. So McDowell’s purely rationalist/cognitivist route 
toward motivating helping behavior seems blocked, and once again we need 
empathy in order for such helping morally good behavior to occur.  
Is there any other possible way for the rationalist to argue that empathy 
isn’t necessary to the kind of helping motives that morality (at least in part) 
depends on? Well, let me mention one other possibility. In What We Owe to Each 
Other, T. M. Scanlon argues that people have reasons for action and belief, that 
they can recognize such reasons, and that the reasons are capable all on their 
own of motivating actions or beliefs.6 For Scanlon, the notion of a reason is not 
reducible to any naturalistic notion, but can in any event be seen as equivalent 
to the idea that a given consideration favors a certain belief or action. Scanlon 
holds that many of us think we have reason to help others, and on his view the 
fact that it appears to one that one has a reason to help someone can on its own 
motivate one to help that person. But such a rationalistic view of moral or 
altruistic motivation (Scanlon is not talking about a “natural virtue” of 
benevolence here) makes no mention of empathy or of any need for empathy in 
order for the appropriate helping motivation to occur and eventuate in actual 
helping, and it is worth considering whether in fact Scanlon’s view can 
coherently avoid any appeal to empathy in the way it seems committed to 
doing. 
I think that, as with McDowell’s views, the psychopath represents a 
stumbling block for Scanlon’s rationalistic views. One thing seems clear: even if 
there appear to some of us to be reasons to help others, such appearances don’t 
occur to the psychopath. It doesn’t seem to him or her that he or she has reason 
to help rather than hurt the person they want to victimize. (I am leaving aside 
cases where the psychopath has an egoistic and ulterior motive for wanting to 
help some other person.) And the best and most obvious explanation of why the 
psychopath doesn’t seem to see any reason to help is that they lack the kind of 
empathy with others that involves feeling what others feel. In that case, 
empathy and the capacity for empathy seem to make the difference between the 
psychopath and those of us to whom there appear to be reasons to help others, 
and so again, as with McDowell, the rationalist account that Scanlon gives of 
helping motivation seems essentially incomplete. The sentimental factor of 
                                           
6 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
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empathy has to be brought into any full picture of the phenomena here, and so I 
am inclined to conclude that any non-egoistic motivation to help others depends 
on empathy. Not only do the so-called natural virtues of sympathy, 
benevolence, and compassion require empathy, but empathy has to be brought 
into any possible account of non-egoistic morally mandated or desirable helping 
motivation. 
But let me now mention one final way in which someone might want to 
claim that the latter sort of motivation might be explained without bringing in 
empathy. It could be said (this is the sort of thing Kant says) that the 
conscientious desire to do one’s duty can motivate someone who thinks it is their 
duty to promote the welfare of others to actually help other people, and it is 
surely far from obvious that the desire to do one’s duty and the recognition or 
belief that one has a duty to help others require empathy. There are in fact two 
ways one might go about answering this possible objection, one more critical, 
one more positive. The critical route will tell us to focus once again on the 
psychopath and ask why such people lack the desire to do their duty (and are 
incapable of guilt for moral failures). Surely, the absence of empathy will be part 
of the most plausible answer, and in that case one cannot invoke the 
conscientious desire to do one’s duty as motivating helping behavior without 
implicitly assuming that the person with such a desire is capable of empathy.7 
But there is also a more positive way of answering the present objection to what 
I have been saying here. The objection effectively assumes that we can have 
moral concepts without having empathy, but many of us hold that psychopaths 
are like the congenitally blind. The latter lack full color concepts even if they 
eventually can tell you that grass is green and blood red. And by the same token 
one might say that psychopaths don’t really understand what terms like “right” 
and “wrong” mean even if they learn (for adaptive social reasons) to be able to 
tell people that stealing and killing are wrong.  
But even if there is some initial tendency nowadays to think that 
psychopaths lack full moral concepts, can this view of them be supported in 
some more definite or positive way? Well, I think it can be, but that is a very 
long story. In my book Moral Sentimentalism, I argue—to some extent following 
Hume—that our second-order empathic experience of being warmed by the first 
order empathic warmth some agent displays toward some third party (e. g., 
                                           
7 Terminologically, the desire to fulfill one’s duty to promote the welfare of others can be 
regarded as a form of altruism even if it isn’t thought to be based on empathy, but I am using 




their friend or sibling) serves to fix the reference of the term “morally good” for 
us; and I argue that the way cold-heartedness empathically chills us helps fix 
the reference of “morally wrong” in a similar fashion. This is not the place to 
repeat the earlier arguments. But if the ideas just mentioned are on the right 
track, they serve to explain why psychopaths are like blind people with respect 
to the relevant concepts. Their lack of associative/emotional empathy undercuts 
their ability to fix the reference of moral terms in the way I believe is essential to 
the meaning, to a proper semantics, of moral language. 
All in all, then, I don’t think we can have beneficent or helping moral 
motivation in the absence of empathy. This goes well beyond anything I or 
anyone else has previously said about the moral role of empathy, and it moves 
us toward the conclusion that empathy is probably the most significant factor in 




Conceptual/philosophical speculation is a very risky business, and I have been 
doing quite a lot of that here. But in this concluding section, I would like to 
speculate further and in a new direction. Let’s say that the above discussion 
supports the idea of an inextricable connection between empathy, on the one 
hand, and sympathy, benevolence, etc., on the other. One can’t have either one 
of them without the other. But consider how this relates to the fact that we 
think of sympathy, benevolence, compassion, and the like both as feelings and 
as motives. The above argument shows or seeks to show that the feeling side of, 
say, compassion is irrecusably tied up with the motivational side, and this in 
and of itself seems to me to be an interesting result. It can seem strange (it 
always has to me) that compassion is considered to be both a feeling and a 
motive, and the argument I have given helps explain how that can make sense. 
If the empathy/feeling side of compassion and the motivational side of 
compassion cannot be separated, then one can see how it makes sense to hold, as 
common sense does, that compassion is a feeling and also a motive. And exactly 
the same points can be made about benevolence, caring, and sympathy. 
But now I want to make what will seem to most of you like an incredible 
leap of topic. I think what I have just been saying offers a philosophical 
foothold for the ancient Chinese complementarity of yin and yang, and if that is 
the case, moral sentimentalism illustrates some themes that go beyond Western 
culture. Now yin and yang are nowadays not thought to be serious topics for 
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philosophical thinking—even by the Chinese. Like us Westerners they are 
accustomed to various popularizations of yin and yang—as with macrobiotic 
diets; and they are aware, as most of us Westerners are not, of how ancient 
yin/yang explanations of physical phenomena (e. g., of how sunlight 
differentially affects the two sides of a hill) have had to yield to more 
quantitative and mathematical explanations of such phenomena of the sort that 
are the mainstay of (elementary) modern physics. But despite these problems or 
limitations, I think suitably updated notions of yin and yang can be useful for 
present-day philosophical purposes, and I am going to try to persuade you of 
that here and now.  
What do I mean by updated versions or notions of yin and yang? In a recent 
article, I have argued that we can make the most ethical sense of yin and yang 
via the Western notions of receptivity and active/rational control.8 Yin is often 
equated with passivity and often with pliancy or pliability, but it is also often 
equated with receptivity (there is no term in Chinese for “receptivity” and “yin” 
may be the closest that language comes to our notion of receptivity). And I 
think that, unlike passivity and pliability, receptivity is a positive and broadly 
valued quality that, equated with yin, can be counterbalanced with or against 
the quality I am proposing to equate with yang, the quality (and notion) of 
active/rational control. 
I have argued elsewhere that Western philosophy has tended to emphasize 
active/rational control at the expense of the value and virtue of receptivity, but 
the point then is that we need and need to value both active/rational control and 
receptivity in our lives and thought. And I think these two qualities can be 
viewed as necessary complements in the moral or ethical life. Again, I have 
made the arguments for this conclusion elsewhere.9 But for present purposes and 
given what was argued earlier, something very interesting (I think) follows if we 
conceive yin and yang in this updated philosophical way. When we empathize 
with the distress of someone who is in pain, we are receptive to them in a way 
the psychopath never is with anyone. And when we ipso facto are then 
motivated to help (remember, though, that this doesn’t mean we actually will 
help—other motivational factors may override our compassion), we are 
motivated to actively do something effective as a means to alleviating the pain 
of the other person; and this motivation to help shows us as active and 
                                           
8 See my “Updating Yin and Yang”, in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 12 (3): 271-
282 (2013). 
9 See my From Enlightenment to Receptivity: Rethinking Our Values, Oxford – New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013.  
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interested in exerting control over what will happen to the other person. 
(Rationality comes in because if one doesn’t, cognitively, seek to find or learn 
about the best means to help the other, the fact of compassion is criterially 
challenged or undercut; one doesn’t count as compassionate if one is slapdash 
about finding proper means to helping the other person.) 
So I am saying that compassion, benevolence, and the like have the yin 
quality of receptive feeling and the yang quality of desiring actively to help in a 
specific way—they have both of these at the same time and, as I have been 
arguing, each aspect is inseparable from the other. And this gives yin and yang a 
deeper, further foothold in our discussion because that complementarity is 
traditionally viewed involving just such an inextricable or irrecusable 
relationship. The traditional symbol of yin and yang depicts yin with a small 
circle of yang in it and yang with a small circle of yin in it, and this is one way to 
symbolize the ancient view that yin and yang is a necessary complementarity, 
that yin and yang are really yin/yang.  
But the present discussion gives these ancient and philosophically somewhat 
vague (and suspect) notions a particular and definite embodiment. If you can’t 
have compassion as feeling without compassion as motivation and vice versa, 
then you can’t have a certain sort of receptivity without also having a certain 
sort of control-seeking activeness and vice versa; and if one buys my updating of 
the notions of yin and yang, then in the sphere of moral sentiments you can’t 
have yin without yang or yang without yin and they are invariably instantiated 
together. The (valued or positive) moral sentiments thus all have a yin/yang 
character, and that is a philosophically significant fact both about the 
sentiments and about the ancient Chinese complementarity of yin/yang.  
But if moral sentimentalism lends itself to an interpretation via the Chinese 
categories of yin and yang, we really shouldn’t be too surprised. What we call 
moral sentimentalism had its origins, in the modern West, in eighteenth-century 
Britain, but there is a strong element or aspect of sentimentalism in traditional 
Confucianism: in Mencius and in neo-Confucians like Cheng Hao and Wang 
Yangming who were strongly influenced by him. However, the specific idea that 
yin/yang applies to compassion and other particular moral sentiments doesn’t 
seem to have occurred to any Confucian or neo-Confucian (or later Chinese) 
philosopher, so what I have just been saying is intended as a contribution to the 
overall Confucian tradition at the same time that it represents, as I believe, a 
philosophical application of yin/yang to or within moral sentimentalism. I also 
think yin/yang has applications outside of ethics, but that is a long story to be 
told on another occasion. 
